Abstract With the reinterpretation of repurchase agreements (repos) by the tax authority and the revision of the national bank law in 1997, allowing the Swiss national bank (SNB) to use repos as monetary policy instrument, the prerequisites for the development of a Swiss franc repo market were given. The development of the repo market in Switzerland only came up in 1999 with the provision of an integrated trading and settlement system provided by SegaInterSettle AG (SIS), Eurex and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) in collaboration with the SNB. The following paper provides an overview of the basic characteristics and structure of the Swiss franc repo market as well as of the development it has undergone since 1999. It also discusses what motives and reasons the banks possess to actively participate in the Swiss franc repo market.
Introduction
Until the end of 1996, a stamp tax, in the form of a turnover tax, was levied on securities sales (including repurchase agreements (repos)) in Switzerland, which made it unattractive for commercial banks to use repurchase agreements and prevented the development of a domestic repo market. From the beginning of 1997, tax authorities in Switzerland reinterpreted repos as a refinancing transaction, omitting the tax levied. In addition to the reinterpretation, the national bank law was revised in November 1997 allowing the Swiss National Bank (SNB) to use repos as an operational instrument for monetary policy purposes. While the Swiss franc repo market was finally launched in April 1998, the development and attractiveness of this market only came up with the provision of an integrated trading, clearing and settlement system provided by SegaInterSettle AG (SIS), Eurex and Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC) in collaboration with the SNB. Since then the market has substantially increased reaching outstanding volumes of up to CHF 70 billion until June 2005. A division of the Swiss franc repo market into two parts, namely in a so-called interbank and a SNB market, reveals that in contrast to the interbank market, the latter one-which the SNB uses for monetary purposes-attained high outstanding volumes from the beginning. The immediate upsurge of the outstanding volume in the SNB market can be ascribed to the fact that the SNB has almost exclusively used repos to implement its monetary policy since 1999. Additionally, the adoption of the new monetary policy framework in 2000 has further increased the importance of repos and supported the development. 1 Only from April 2004 onwards did the outstanding interbank volume surpass the one of the SNB market and remain higher for most of the time.
Of the few publications on the Swiss franc repo market, the paper by Jordan and Kugler (2004) stands out. With data from January 2000 to September 2003 they show that the SNB has had a statistically significant influence on the 3M-Libor volatility. By fully meeting the banks liquidity needs, the SNB was able to minimize interest rate volatility. In addition they found out that there exists a volatility trade-off with respect to the maturity structure of repo transactions used for monetary policy. Relying more on repos with a 1-day maturity decreased (increased) the volatility of the 1W-Libor (1M-and 3M-Libor), while using week maturities increased (decreased) the volatility of the 1W-Libor (1M-and 3M-Libor). A calculation of the variance of the 3M-Libor, defined as the average of squared deviations from the target rate, 2 reveals that the SNB has managed to reduce the volatility from up to 23 basis points 
